| 000 | 01218nam a22001697a 4500 | ||
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| 008 | 190323b xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d | ||
| 022 | _a0304-405X | ||
| 245 |
_aCEO attributes, compensation, and firm value: Evidence from a structural estimation / by T. Beau Page _cT. Beau Page |
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| 260 |
_aAmsterdam _bElsevier _cMay 2018 |
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| 300 | _a Pages 378-401 | ||
| 440 |
_a Journal of Financial Economics _v128 (2) _x0304-405X |
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| 500 | _aAbstract I present and estimate a dynamic model of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation and effort provision. I find that variation in CEO attributes explains the majority of variation in compensation (equity and total) but little of the variation in firm value. The primary drivers of cross-sectional compensation are risk aversion and influence on the board. Additionally, I estimate the magnitude of CEO agency issues. Removing CEO influence increases shareholder value in the typical firm by 1.74%, making CEOs risk neutral increases shareholder value by 16.12%, and removing all agency frictions increases shareholder value by 28.99%. | ||
| 690 | _aCEO compensation | ||
| 690 | _aDynamic principal-agent model | ||
| 690 | _aStructural estimation | ||
| 942 |
_2lcc _cSE |
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| 999 |
_c361358 _d361358 |
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