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008			190312b xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
022			_a0304-405X
245			_aPlaying favorites: Conflicts of interest in mutual fund management / by Diane Del Guercio, Egemen Genç, Hai Tran _cDiane Del Guercio, Egemen Genç, Hai Tran
260			_aAmsterdam _bElsevier _cJune 2018
300			_aPages 535-557
440			_aJournal of Financial Economics _v128 (3) _x0304-405X
520			_aAbstract We examine the performance of mutual funds whose managers simultaneously manage portfolios with performance-based incentive fees for three account types: mutual funds, hedge funds, and separate accounts. Importantly, our data set is free of selection bias because it is hand-collected from mandatory SEC filings. We find that only funds whose managers also manage hedge funds significantly underperform peer mutual funds. Moreover, underperformance begins only after fund managers begin to manage a hedge fund. We find that managerial incentives and opportunities for cross-subsidization explain variation in underperformance across funds, supporting the conflicts of interest hypothesis in the debate on “side-by-side management.”
690			_aConflicts of interest
690			_aMutual funds
690			_aHedge funds
690			_aPerformance-based fees
690			_aSide-by-side management
942			_2lcc _cSE
999			_c361347 _d361347