000			01659nam a22001937a 4500
008			190312b xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
022			_a0304-405X
245			_aAre stock-financed takeovers opportunistic? / by B. Espen Eckbo, Tanakorn Makaew, Karin S. Thorburn _cB. Espen Eckbo, Tanakorn Makaew, Karin S. Thorburn
260			_aAmsterdam _bElsevier _c June 2018
300			_aPages 443-465
440			_aJournal of Financial Economics _v128 (3) _x0304-405X
520			_aAbstract The more the target knows about the bidder, the more difficult is paying the target with overpriced bidder shares. Thus, when bidders are opportunistic, the fraction of stock in the deal payment will be lower for better informed targets. We test this intuitive prediction against the alternative that stock payments primarily reflect bidder concerns with target adverse selection, which implies a greater fraction of stock in the deal payment for better informed targets. Discriminating between these two mutually exclusive and nested predictions requires measures of target information about the bidder but not of market mispricing. We find that public bidders systematically use more stock in the payment when the target knows more about the bidder. Tests exploiting exogenous variation in bidder market-to-book ratios also fail to support bidder opportunism. Finally, greater potential competition from private bidders is associated with greater propensity for public bidders to pay in cash.
690			_aTakeover bidding
690			_aPayment method
690			_aStock payment
690			_aAdverse selection
690			_aAcquirer mispricing
942			_2lcc _cSE
999			_c361343 _d361343