000 | 01496nam a22001697a 4500 | ||
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008 | 190311b xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d | ||
022 | _a0304-405X | ||
245 |
_aThe consequences of managerial indiscretions: Sex, lies, and firm value / by Brandon N. Cline, Ralph A. Walkling & Adam S. Yore _cBrandon N. Cline, Ralph A. Walkling & Adam S. Yore |
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260 |
_aAmsterdam _bElsevier _cFebruary 2018 |
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300 | _aPages 389-415 | ||
440 |
_aJournal of Financial Economics _v127 (2) _x0304-405X |
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500 | _aAbstract Personal managerial indiscretions are separate from a firm's business activities but provide information about the manager's integrity. Consequently, they could affect counterparties’ trust in the firm and the firm's value and operations. We find that companies of accused executives experience significant wealth deterioration, reduced operating margins, and lost business partners. Indiscretions are also associated with an increased probability of unrelated shareholder-initiated lawsuits, Department of Justice and Securities and Exchange Commission investigations, and managed earnings. Further, chief executive officers and boards face labor market consequences, including forced turnover, pay cuts, and lower shareholder votes at re-election. Indiscretions occur more often at poorly governed firms where disciplinary turnover is less likely. | ||
690 | _aManagerial indiscretions | ||
690 | _aManagement quality | ||
690 | _aEarnings management | ||
942 |
_2lcc _cSE |
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999 |
_c361340 _d361340 |